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Abstract 
In early 2017, after the nomination of Martin Schulz as candidate for chancellor, the SPD 
experienced a rapid surge in public support as measured in public opinion polls. Yet, the upward 
trend proved short-lived and the SPD ended up with the worst election result since 1949. Using 
data from a multi-wave panel survey, this analysis examines the voting trajectories of eight 
thousand German citizens over the course of one year in order to investigate the processes 
underlying the so called ‘Schulz effect’. The voter trajectories show that the surge and decline 
of public support for the SPD was accompanied by some reshuffling in the composition of its 
electorate. Moreover, different explanations of the party’s swaying in the polls are tested, 
showing that the SPD achieved the activation of dormant party identifiers but attracted and then 
lost other voters with diverse characteristics and policy preferences.  
Key words 
Bundestagswahl; Wählerwanderung; voting behavior; federal elections; German Longitudinal 
Election Study (GLES); vote switching; campaign effects 
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1. Introduction1 
Among other features of the 2017 election the so-called “Schulz effect” deserves scholarly 
attention. Early in 2017, quite surprisingly, SPD chairman Gabriel announced that Martin 
Schulz would become the party’s chancellor candidate (for an account of the flow of the events 
see Feldenkirchen 2018; SPD 2018). In the wake of this announcement, Mr. Schulz gained 
tremendously in popularity as did the SPD. The Social Democrats unanimously made Mr. 
Schulz their new chairman and attempted to keep the momentum (“Schulz-Zug” [“Schulz 
train”]) as long as possible. Yet, the SPD’s surge in public support proved not durable. Rather, 
the SPD support declined again and the Social Democrats ended up with the worst result in 
federal elections since the founding of the Federal Republic. 
From a public opinion perspective, this process squares nicely with the notion of a volatile 
electorate (e.g., Weßels et al. 2014). Taking a closer look, it raises questions about the 
underlying dynamics, however. Contemporaneous accounts and prior research on the dynamics 
of public opinion suggest different explanations. We shall focus on four of them. According to 
the floating voter hypothesis (Daudt 1961), less involved voters are particularly prone to 
volatility and will switch between parties that manage to get public attention (see also, e.g., 
Converse 1962; Zaller 1989, 1992). From this perspective, the so-called Schulz effect was a 
publicity effect that had nothing to do with the candidate’s qualities or policies but probably 
reflected effects of the availability heuristic. In addition, if the SPD had managed to sustain the 
public attention until September, it would have fared well on Election Day. 
The nomination of Mr. Schulz could also be read as the start of a long campaign preceding the 
2017 federal election. This signal could have caused an activation effect (e.g., Lazarsfeld et al. 
1944: 75f., Finkel/Schrott 1995), leading some SPD supporters back to the fold who before had 
 
1 Appendices (Question wordings, additional information on the analysis) and replication material (Stata syntaxes) 
can be retrieved from http://osf.io/gdms6. Readers without the necessary software can run and extend the analysis 
in the browser at https://dx.doi.org/10/cqsg. 
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switched to a different party, indecision, or abstention. This effect is unlikely to fade away until 
Election Day. By implication, the decrease in support for the SPD was not caused by the same 
voters that caused its surge. Instead, partisan independents and supporters of other parties may 
have left the SPD, probably in response to the unfolding campaigns of competing parties. 
Focusing on the substantive implications of Mr. Schulz’s nomination, the new candidate may 
have been perceived as changing key attributes of the SPD – and voters may have responded to 
these changes by switching their votes to the SPD (see Feldenkirchen 2018). Leaving aside the 
personality of the candidate, the new leader may have signaled a policy change of the SPD. As 
a high-profile politician at the EU level, Mr. Schulz may have established a more pro-European 
stance of the SPD or a stronger focus on this topic. When Mr. Schulz was nominated, the SPD 
talked much about social justice, thereby signaling a different policy focus – and attracting 
voters with these policy preferences. Fourth, Mr. Schulz was widely perceived as a newcomer 
to the national political scene. Aside from a genuine novelty effect, he may thus have succeeded 
in attracting politically disenchanted voters.  
These four accounts suggest that the SPD attracted voters for quite different reasons.2 Though 
not completely impossible, combining these different appeals over the course of a campaign is 
quite difficult. It is thus little wonder that after a few weeks, Mr. Schulz made policy choices. 
Under his leadership, the SPD did not focus on European integration during the campaign 
(Schoen 2018). Social justice was more central to the campaign, but the party did not come up 
with clear policy proposals (Feldenkirchen 2018). Given the policy accounts, staunch 
supporters of European integration among the new SPD supports may have left the party again. 
Likewise, Mr. Schulz was no longer an outsider to the national political scene. The SPD may 
thus have faced difficulties capitalizing on anti-politics feelings in the electorate. Finally, as the 
 
2 These explanations may interact as, e.g., some policy arguments may be of particular importance for highly 
involved voters or partisan independents.  
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SPD surge ended and the other parties started their campaigns, the SPD may have run into 
difficulties capitalizing on popularity effects and keeping adherents of other parties. 
Against this backdrop, we aim at shedding light on the dynamics of public opinion that gave 
rise to the increase in support of the SPD in the wake of Mr. Schulz’s nomination and the 
ensuing decline. The analysis starts by addressing the question from which partisan sources the 
SPD attracted new supporters and for whom they cast their final vote. We then turn to the 
question how the four selected accounts perform in explaining the increase and the ensuing 
decrease in SPD support. We conclude by summing up key findings and discussing 
implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. The flow of voters  
In our analysis of the anatomy of the so-called Schulz effect, we start by addressing the question 
from which (partisan) sources the sharp increase in SPD support derived and which voters left 
the Social Democrats until Election Day. To tackle these questions, we draw on data from the 
online (campaign) panel survey conducted in the framework of the German Longitudinal 
Election Study (GLES). Respondents were drawn from an online-access panel maintained by 
the service provider Respondi AG, using a quota design (combined marginal distributions of 
age, sex, and education). The respondents were first interviewed in fall 2016. Six additional 
interviews took place before the 2017 federal election; another survey wave was carried out 
immediately after Election Day (Roßteutscher et al. 2018). These data are thus well-suited to 
analyze the dynamics of attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behavior (as reported by 
respondents) at the aggregate and the individual level.  
For this analysis, we rely on information from three survey waves. The interviews conducted 
in fall 2016 (October 6th–November 10th, 2016) provide information about attitudes and 
behavioral intentions well before the nomination of Mr. Schulz. The second survey wave was 
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carried out from February 16th to March 3rd, 2017 when the surge of public support (as measured 
in published polls) almost peaked. Finally, we use information from the post-election survey 
carried out from September 27th 2017 to October 9th 2017. This set-up serves to address our 
research question concerning the surge of SPD support and its decline until Election Day. At 
the same, we omit information from four additional pre-election waves conducted from May to 
September 2017 and thereby we underestimate the intra-individual volatility in attitudes and 
behavior in the run-up to the 2017 election (see Steinbrecher and Schoen 2013). In the 2016 
survey 18,079 persons participated. For 9,658 of these participants we also have information 
from the surveys carried out in February 2017 and after the 2017 election. This decline in the 
number of respondents indicates considerable panel attrition and, alongside with the non-
probability based selection of respondents and panel conditioning, suggests caution when 
generalizing findings.  
Using data on respondents who participated in the three selected survey waves, in a first step 
we analyzed the intra-individual trajectories of voting intentions (in the two pre-election 
surveys) and reported voting behavior (in the post-election survey). Specifically, we focused 
on those respondents that reported the intention to vote for the Social Democrats in the survey 
conducted in February 2017. For these voters, we figured out voting intentions in fall 2016, i.e., 
before the nomination of Mr. Schulz, and voting behavior in the 2017 election, as measured in 
the post-election survey. Using this information, we distinguish between four trajectories of 
voting behavior. First, some voters already intended to vote for the Social Democrats in fall 
2016 and actually did so in September 2017. The second category contains voters who switched 
to the SPD after the nomination of Martin Schulz and voted for it in September 2017. As some 
kind of mirror image, a third category intended to vote for the SPD in fall 2016 and in February 
2017 but defected until Election Day. Finally, we consider voters who switched to the SPD 
from fall 2016 to February 2017 but did not vote for the Social Democrats in September 2017. 
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Examining these types of voter trajectories toward and away from the Social Democrats, we 
find that the party’s surge and decline in the popular support derived from a more complex 
pattern than a simple flow-and-ebb model. To begin with, a significant portion (38 percent) of 
voters who intended to cast a ballot for the SPD in February 2017 had already voiced this 
intention in fall 2016 and ultimately voted for this party in September 2017. Among voters with 
changing voting trajectories, a sizable number switched to the Social Democrats after the 
nomination of Mr. Schulz but defected again until September 2017 (31 percent of all SPD voters 
in February). At the same time, the SPD attracted new voters in the wake of the nomination of 
its chancellor candidate. 19 percent of all respondents with SPD vote intention in February 2017 
had reported a different voting intention in fall 2016 but ended up voting for the SPD in the 
federal election. Adding to the complexity of individual-level trajectories, the party also lost a 
sizable portion of voters who intended to vote for the SPD in fall 2016 and February 2017 until 
Election Day (13 percent of all SPD voters in February). Altogether, in 2017 the aggregate-
level polls displayed an increase and ensuing decrease of SPD party shares which suggests that 
some voters turned to the SPD and then defected from it. In fact, the individual-level trajectories 
are more diverse than that. The party retained some of its new supporters but simultaneously 
lost old and new supporters in the run-up to Election Day.  
In an attempt to take a closer look at the dynamics underlying the surge and decline in public 
support of the SPD, we investigated the individual-level trajectories of respondents who 
intended to vote for the SPD in February 2017 by their voting intention in fall 2016 and their 
ultimate electoral decision. In Figure 1, the percentages in brackets on the x-scale report how 
many voters the SPD won from each party. Not surprisingly, 50 percent who reported an 
intention to vote for the SPD in February had already intended to vote for this party some 
months before. Turning to party switchers, a large share of SPD voters came from the Greens 
(eleven percent) and the Left party (eight percent). Another large source of new voters came to 
SPD from the pool of voters who previously exhibited no voting intention, i.e., wanted to 
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abstain or did not know whom to vote for (16 percent). In addition, in early 2017 the SPD 
attracted some voters from parties which may not be considered usual suspects when it comes 
to the partisan sources of SPD voters. Five percent of SPD voters in February 2017 previously 
intended to vote for CDU/CSU, another five for the AfD, and three percent for the FDP. Hence, 
it is impossible to pinpoint the origins of the SPD’s surge in popularity to a specific partisan 
source or to a specific set of parties. Instead, voters with diverse partisan backgrounds saw 
reason to switch to the SPD after the nomination of Mr. Schulz.  
Figure 1: Voting trajectories from Sep16–Sep17 among SPD voters in Feb 2017  
 
Note: The analysis only includes respondents who intended to vote SPD in February 2017. Columns indicate 
voting intentions in October 2016. The segments in each column indicate the respective voters’ ultimate vote 
choice in September 2017. The residual category contains voters who intended to abstain, to vote for one of the 
smaller party, or who did not know whom to vote for. N=2,275. 
 
We now turn to the question of how these voters ended up voting in September 2017. In Figure 
1, the segments of each column indicate which parties the respective voters finally cast their 
ballot for. The first column presents the results for voters who already intended to vote for the 
SPD in the fall of 2016. It shows that three out of four of these respondents stayed with the 
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party until Election Day. About seven percent of voters with an SPD voting intention in fall 
2016 and early 2017 decided to vote for the CDU/CSU, another five percent for the Greens. 
This means that there is not a specific party that attracted all SPD defectors in this group.  
Turning to those respondents who did not already intend to vote for the SPD in the fall of 2016, 
the analysis yields two groups of voters which deserve particular attention. First, roughly one 
in three voters was persuaded to favor the SPD by early 2017 and stayed with the party until 
Election Day. For a second group of voters, sympathy with the SPD was only a brief interlude. 
After switching to the SPD in the wake of Mr. Schulz’s nomination, these voters returned to 
their previous vote choices until Election Day. The respondents who intended to vote for the 
FDP in fall 2016 are a case in point. One out of three previous FDP voters stuck with the SPD, 
another third returned to the FDP until Election Day, and the remaining third cast a vote for one 
of the other parties.  
In summary, the evidence lends credence to the notion that the aggregate-level increase and 
decline of popular support of the SPD in 2017 resulted from a complex pattern of individual-
level trajectories. In early 2017, the SPD attracted new voters from diverse partisan sources. 
Some of these voters ended up casting their vote for the SPD, while others returned to their 
previously preferred party or defected to another one. Likewise, some of the voters who 
intended to vote for the SPD both in fall 2016 and in early 2017 ended up not casting an SPD 
vote. The remarkable level of volatility in popular support of the SPD goes hand in hand with 
considerable partisan heterogeneity of its sources.  
3. Exploring determinants of switching to and defecting from the SPD 
The heterogeneity of individual-level trajectories that gave rise to the surge and decline in 
popular support for the SPD fits with the existence of various accounts for the up and down in 
SPD support. It is tempting to conclude that one account applies to one type of partisan 
trajectories, while others help to explain other trajectories. Yet, the number of individual-level 
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patterns does not say anything about the explanatory power of the four models outlined above. 
In this section we explore the explanatory power of the different accounts presented in the 
introduction. 
We begin by analyzing the question of how the four accounts perform in explaining the vote 
changes to the SPD from fall 2016 to early 2017. We ran a logistic regression with the 
dependent variable indicating whether a person switched to the SPD or not. Given the 
possibility that some accounts may apply to some partisan subgroups but not to others, we 
include interaction terms that indicate if specific effects are stronger based on the respondent’s 
prior voting intention. To test the floating voter hypothesis, we utilized the self-reported level 
of political interest as an indicator of involvement. In attempt to explore activation effects, we 
considered whether a respondent reported identifying with the SPD or not. Turning to the notion 
that Mr. Schulz’s nomination helped the SPD to attract voters with specific policy convictions, 
we relied on respondents’ attitudes toward European integration (‘promote European 
integration‘ vs. ‘European integration has gone too far‘) and social policy (‘lower taxes and 
fewer welfare state benefits‘ vs. ‘higher taxes and more welfare state benefits‘). As the refugee 
crisis increased the saliency of immigration as an issue, we included attitudes toward 
immigration policy (‘relax immigration restrictions’ vs. ‘make immigration restrictions 
tougher’) as a control variable in order to avoid biased estimates. Finally, to assess the role of 
political disenchantment in accounting for the surge in popular support of the SPD, we created 
a summary index of four indicators measuring disenchantment with the political parties (e.g., 
‘The parties’ only concern is their power’).  
Each explanatory variable was measured in October 2016, i.e. before the nomination of Mr. 
Schulz and the ensuing increase in support of the SPD took place. For ease of interpretation, 
continuous variables were dichotomized at the scale mid-point or the sample average (political 
disenchantment). Replicating the analyses with continuous variables, however, yields results 
that do not differ substantially from the ones presented here (see Appendices 2 and 4). 
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Employing this analytical strategy, we compare, e.g., the likelihood of switching to the SPD 
among politically highly and lowly interested respondents. All independent variables were 
included in the same model in order to tease out the variables’ unique explanatory power while 
holding all others constant. Question wordings and operationalization details are documented 
in Supplement 1.  
In order to make the results of the analysis easily accessible, Figure 2 reports the main results 
in graphical form.3 The markers in the figure reflect the difference in the likelihood of switching 
to the SPD from fall 2016 to early 2017 between the two groups each independent variable 
comprises. In order to account for the statistical uncertainty of the results, each marker is 
enclosed in 95% confidence intervals. In this vein, Figure 2 shows consistent and large effects 
for party identification in the decision to switch a vote to the SPD. For example, among those 
voters who had intended to vote for the CDU/CSU in fall 2016, SPD identifiers were by some 
24 percent more likely to switch to the SPD than other voters. The influence of party 
identification applies to all subgroups alike. The fact that party identifiers switched to the party 
they identify with might seem like a truism, but it is by no means self-evident. Sometimes, 
voters feel long-standing ties to a party but still decide not to vote for this party for one reason 
or the other. Regarding the SPD, in fall 2016, four out of ten SPD identifiers did not intend to 
vote for the SPD. After Schulz was declared the party’s candidate, this share fell to 27 percent. 
The evidence thus appears to lend support to the idea that the nomination of Mr. Schulz helped 
the SPD to lead some adherents back to the fold. 
  
 
3 Appendix 2 contains the full regression tables and shows the predicted probabilities of switching to the SPD for 
each category of the explanatory variables.  
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Figure 2: Determinants of switching to the SPD in February 2017, by voting intention in fall 
2016 
 
Note: The graph shows differences in predicted mean probabilities to vote for the SPD in early 2017 comparing 
the explanatory variables’ binary categories (e.g. high/low). Baseline of party switching toward SPD: 14 percent 
of all respondents. Based on logistic regressions among respondents who did not intend to vote for the SPD in 
October 2016, N=8,019, Pseudo R²=.09. The residual category contains voters who intended to abstain, to vote for 
one of the smaller party or who did not know who to vote for. Full regression tables are reported in Appendix 2. 
Interpretation example:  Among respondents who previously intended to vote for the FDP, the probability to switch 
to the SPD in February 2017 is eight percentage points higher when they support a larger welfare state than among 
respondents who oppose a larger welfare state. 
 
Where the remaining accounts are concerned, the evidence is less supportive. The markers in 
Figure 2 show inconsistent associations of political interest with changing vote intentions in 
favor of the SPD. Among voters who intended to cast a vote for the CDU/CSU or the AfD, high 
levels of political involvement appear to be associated with a lower likelihood of switching to 
the SPD. In other words, the SPD could disproportionately draw support from lowly involved 
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voters among adherents of these parties. Among respondents who intended to vote for the Left, 
the direction of the relationship is the opposite. In any case, the effects of political interest are 
small and hardly distinguishable from zero (see Appendix 2, table 2 for average marginal effects 
in the full sample). Accordingly, the idea that Schulz mainly attracted floating voters with low 
levels of political involvement does not receive strong support. Political disenchantment also is 
not a strong predictor of switching to the SPD. Even within specific partisan subgroups (e.g., 
AfD voters) political disenchantment does not make much of a difference in predicting vote 
switching to the SPD. 
 Turning to policy attitudes, the evidence provides rather weak support for their relevance as 
drivers of vote switching between fall 2016 and early 2017. Voters who support the European 
integration were a bit more likely to switch to the SPD after the nomination of Mr. Schulz. 
However, even though Mr. Schulz’s background as the former president of the European 
Parliament was widely discussed in the first days of his campaign (Schoen 2018), pro-European 
attitudes were not the defining characteristic of his supporters. In fact, the far-from-strong 
statistical relationships imply that many voters who oppose further EU-integration also 
switched to the SPD.4 Likewise, support for higher taxes and more welfare state expenses is 
associated with a slightly increased likelihood to switch to the SPD in early 2017. This 
relationship is most pronounced, albeit not strong, among former supporters of the FDP, 
probably the party which is most skeptical of high welfare expenses. This pattern suggests that 
some people learned that their policy preferences were at odds with the positions of their then 
preferred party and switched to SPD which appeared to be a better fit.5 These results suggest 
that Mr. Schulz did not attract a group of like-minded voters with common policy preferences 
 
4 The distributions of the responses on the original seven-point scale show that policy attitudes of vote switchers 
to the SPD were almost normally distributed (i.e., comprising supporters and opponents) and did not deviate 
substantially from other groups of voters (see Appendix 3).  
5 Attitudes toward immigration have no effect on vote switching (not plotted, see Appendix 2). 
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but that the SPD’s chancellor candidate assembled a coalition with diverse and sometimes 
contradictory points of view on important political issues.   
Thus far, the analysis demonstrated that the increase in popular support of the SPD in the wake 
of the announcement of Mr. Schulz’s candidacy was driven by SPD adherents returning to their 
fold. The nomination of the chancellor candidate activated dormant party attachments. In 
comparison, political involvement, policy attitudes, and political disenchantment did not play 
an important role, if any. This does not imply that there are no individuals who exhibited 
behavioral trajectories in line with the selected theories. Even if some voters were driven by the 
theoretically suggested motivations, many others also exhibited the opposite pattern. Put 
differently, Mr. Schulz and his statements may have meant different things to different people 
and people with quite different political views switched to the SPD.  
In a final step of our analysis we turn to the question whether the selected arguments help to 
account for the decrease of popular support the SPD experienced in the run-up to the 2017 
election. We ran a logistic regression model for all respondents who intended to vote for the 
SPD in early 2017. The dependent variable indicates whether respondents ended up voting for 
the SPD or not. As decline was driven by some of the switchers in early 2017 but also by voters 
who supported the SPD before the nomination of Mr. Schulz (see section 2 above), we included 
both groups of SPD voters into the analysis. The independent variables are the same as in the 
previous analysis. The only exception is a variable capturing whether respondents identified 
with any party other than the SPD. It was included as an additional control variable to explore 
whether the evolving campaigns led some party identifiers from the SPD back to their original 
predisposition (not shown in the main text, see Appendix 4, Figure 1). Because the analysis 
does not reveal meaningful differences depending on the respondents’ prior voting intention, to 
ease the interpretation we show only the variables’ average effects (see appendix 4 for results 
by subgroups). Figure 3 reports the main results in graphical form. 
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The results strongly support the idea that identifying with the SPD increased the likelihood of 
casting an SPD vote. SPD identifiers are 25 percentage points more likely to stick with the party 
until Election Day than voters without long-standing ties to the SPD. This finding is note-
worthy because during campaigns even party identifiers may defect (e.g., Schoen et al. 2017: 
137-139). Moreover, we should keep in mind that SPD attachments facilitated some voters’ 
decision to switch their votes to the SPD in early 2017. The evidence thus suggests that SPD 
identifiers brought their voting intentions in line with their predispositions and often remained 
with the party until Election Day. 
 
Figure 3: Determinants of final vote choice for SPD, by voting intention in October 2016 
 
Note: The graph shows differences in predicted mean probabilities to vote for SPD at the federal election 
comparing the explanatory variables’ binary categories (e.g., high/low). Based on a multivariate logistic 
regression on respondents with SPD vote intention in February 2017, N=2,120, Pseudo R²=.16. SPD vote share 
among these respondents: 57 percent. Full regression table in Appendix 4.  
 
The other accounts on the Schulz effect do no contribute much to the explanation of which 
voters left the SPD between early 2017 and the federal election. There is only limited evidence 
for the argument that Martin Schulz had built his short-lived success on floating voters with 
 15 
 
low levels of political involvement. The analysis shows that politically interested voters tended 
to be more likely to stay with the SPD than voters who are not interested in politics. However, 
a closer examination reveals that the positive effect of political interest is driven primarily by 
SPD voters who intended to vote for the party even before the Schulz effect, whereas political 
interest does not explain final vote choice among voters who had switched to the SPD in early 
2017 (see Appendix 4, Figure 1). The small role of political interest coincides with the absence 
of meaningful associations between political disenchantment and SPD voting. Politically 
frustrated voters were no more likely to switch their vote choices to a different party or to 
abstain from voting altogether. Altogether, the analysis does not provide evidence for the idea 
that the party’s quick decline in the polls could be attributed to voters who are more distant to 
and disenchanted with politics and left the party (again) after the initial elation in early 2017. 
Policy opinions are not associated with a vote choice for the SPD among the investigated group 
of voters. What someone thinks about European integration or the welfare state does not predict 
whether he or she will remain with the SPD or switch to another party. Even though the SPD 
had made the strategic decision not to emphasize the European experiences of the chancellor 
candidate (cf. Feldenkirchen 2018), thereby possibly alienating adherents with pro-European 
attitudes, the evidence does not support such an interpretation. Even when the electorate is 
broken down by partisan groups, there is no association between attitudes towards European 
integration and stability in SPD voting intentions (see Appendix 4, Figure 1). Likewise, whether 
SPD adherents from early 2017 finally cast their votes for the party did not depend on welfare 
state preferences. Opponents and supporters of a larger welfare state were equally likely to turn 
their backs on the party. Altogether, policy orientations do not have great explanatory value 
with regards to the final voting decision for the SPD.    
In testing the explanatory power of the four theoretical accounts, the analysis investigating vote 
choices in the federal election suggests similar conclusions as the analysis investigating party 
switching in February 2017. Party identification plays an important role in explaining both the 
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ups and downs of the social democrats as the party achieved the activation of dormant adherents 
in the beginning of the year and party identification functioned as a stabilizing force of voting 
behavior in the year’s remainder when public opinion turned against the party. However, neither 
policy preferences nor levels of political disenchantment or involvement distinguish SPD 
voting decisions.  
4. Conclusion 
Early in 2017, after the nomination of Martin Schulz as candidate for chancellor, the SPD 
experienced a rapid surge in public support as measured in public opinion polls. For a short 
period of time, the SPD seemed capable of becoming the largest party in the 2017 German 
federal election. Yet, the upward trend proved short-lived and the SPD ended up with the worst 
election result since 1949. Using data from a multi-wave panel survey, this analysis 
demonstrated that the party’s surge and decline in public support was not solely driven by voters 
switching to the SPD and then leaving it again. Rather, the party also attracted a substantial 
number of voters who stayed with the party until Election Day and, at the same time, lost voters 
who had intended to vote for the Social Democrats before the nomination of Martin Schulz. Put 
differently, the surge and decline of public support for the SPD was accompanied by some 
reshuffling among the composition of its electorate. 
Taking a closer look at the individual-level trajectories, voters from diverse partisan sources 
switched to the SPD or left it again. We furthermore found considerable heterogeneity when it 
comes to voter attitudes and characteristics that predicted switching to the SPD and finally 
voting for this party. To be sure, some of the selected theoretical accounts proved valuable in 
accounting for voter trajectories. Activation effects appear to have played a role as SPD 
attachments made voters more likely to switch to this party in early 2017 and to stick to it until 
Election Day. However, even though one popular explanation attributes the party’s rapid rise 
and decline to lowly involved voters who were attracted by spectacle rather than political 
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substance, there is no evidence for a significant role of political interest in voting decisions for 
the SPD. Likewise, politically disenchanted voters were not more likely to turn to or away from 
the party at any stage of the electoral campaign. Policy-based accounts did not have much 
explanatory value either as voter attitudes towards Europe or towards the welfare state did not 
significantly predict SPD voting behavior. This means, e.g., that almost as many opponents as 
supporters of further European integration switched to the SPD. Put differently, aside from the 
activation of SPD adherents, the surge of SPD support in the wake of Mr. Schulz’s nomination 
brought together a broad coalition of voters from diverse sources and holding quite diverse 
attitudes. There appears to be no overriding theme that united these voters. Hence, the party 
managed to activate dormant party adherents and to assemble a heterogeneous coalition of 
different segments of the electorate but failed to uphold this alliance until the federal election 
took place.  
The rather poor performance of most arguments we put to test in this analysis may be accounted 
for in different ways. First, these arguments may actually play a role, but we did not manage to 
include the appropriate indicators in the analysis. Second, these arguments simply did not 
matter for voting trajectories. Other forces, not covered by our analysis, may have driven them. 
If, e.g., overall trends in media coverage affected all switchers alike, then this effect would be 
invisible in an analysis that focuses on individual differences. Finally, the poor performance 
may reflect our decision to not take a close look at additional subgroups. Consider the 
possibility that Martin Schulz served as an object of projection for diverse and even 
contradictory hopes. One segment of the switchers to the SPD might have comprised politically 
highly involved European federalists who expected Mr. Schulz to fulfill a visionary agenda for 
transnational politics, whereas other lowly involved voters supported Mr. Schulz even though 
they were skeptical of the European project and politics in general but were driven by the 
expectation that an outsider might stir up the status quo. The heterogeneity of origins and 
 18 
 
attitudes among voters who switched to the SPD in the wake of the candidate’s nomination 
suggests that this line of reasoning deserves further investigation in future research. 
As is every empirical analysis, this study also is subject to various limitations. First, the analyses 
are based on an online sample of self-selected individuals in which respondents with higher 
education and higher levels of political involvement are over-represented. Because individuals 
are not equally likely to respond to survey invitations, further biases in the sample might have 
arisen from panel attrition. These observations call for caution in generalizing findings to the 
electorate as a whole. Even though the original data source measured voters’ attitudes and 
behaviors eight times in the run-up to the federal election, this study only used measurements 
at three points in time to reduce complexity. Therefore, this analytical strategy assumes stability 
when a respondent reports the same attitude between two survey waves and thereby might 
under-estimate the extent of attitudinal dynamics. Thus, a more fine-grained analysis may have 
revealed even more changes in voting intentions and higher degrees of complexity in voter 
trajectories than suggested by the results presented here. Finally, the research design warrants 
caution in making causal claims about the origins of voting decisions. On one hand, 
theoretically plausible statistical associations between voter characteristics and voter behavior 
as those shown in this study do not constitute sufficient evidence of causal relationships. 
Moreover, we should keep in mind that not all dynamics in voting behavior regarding the SPD 
are due to its chancellor candidate as many other events and considerations might have 
influenced voting decisions during the electoral campaign. Despite these limitations, this article 
demonstrated the potential of panel data to investigate voter trajectories over long periods, 
which may refine and enhance the insights from polling methods that take snapshots of political 
attitudes at only one point in time.  
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